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Abstract 
Discovery and classification of overlap nodes in communities is an important topic in data mining. In this paper, a 
new method is proposed, it is based on fuzzy bargaining sets. To uncover overlap nodes, we assume that each node is 
a selfish player who selects communities to join by participation level base on her own utility measurement. We 
allow each player to select multiple communities, which naturally captures the concept of  “overlapping 
communities”. We conduct experiments on this method, and the results show that our algorithm is effective in 
discovering overlapping communities, the value in practice and academic study is demonstrated. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
Keywords: Overlapping communities; fuzzy  reactive  bargaining  set; fuzzy semireactive bargaining set; fuzzy Mas-Colell 
bargaining set 
1. Introduction 
Identifying the community structure is crucial to understand the structural and functional properties of 
the networks(M.E.J. Newman,2003).Many methods have been proposed to identify the community 
structure of complex network. The first kind of method produces a partition, generally, this kind of 
method is suitable for understanding the entire structure of networks, especially for the networks with a 
small size. The second kind of method aims to discover the vertex sets with a high density of edges. This 
kind of method is appropriate to find the cohesive regions in large scale networks (A.Clauset, M.E.J. 
Newman, C. Moore,2004; J.Duch, A.Arenas,2005). 
In this paper,  we present a novel overlapping community structures discovery algorithm base on fuzzy 
bargaining sets.. We model each node as a player trying to optimize her own utility by joining 
communities with participation level, which we define as a overlapping community formation game. This 
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game naturally incorporates overlapping communities, because we allow each individual player to select 
multiple communities by her participation level as long as it could improve her utility.   
2. Overlapping community formation game 
In this section, we formally define overlapping community formation game. In our fuzzy network 
game, a community is a vector s∈[0,1]N，The i-th coordinate si of s is the participation level of player i 
in the overlapping community s. Instead of [0,1]N  we will also write FN for the set of community on 
player set N. We denote by ei the community eN=(1,1, …,1) is called the grand community and e∮
=(0,0, …,0) corresponds to the empty community. We denote the set of all nonempty community by F0N = 
FN\{ e∮}. For s∈FN , we define the carrier of  s  by car(s)={i∈N|si>0}   a  proper community  if car(s)≠
N. The set of proper communities on player set  N  is denoted by PFN , and the set of  nonempty proper 
communities on player set  N  by PF0
N. A overlapping community formation fuzzy network game  with 
player set N is a Map v:FN→R,with the property v(e∮)=0. The map v assigns to each community a real 
number, telling what such a community can achieve in cooperation. The set of overlapping community 
formation games with player set N will be denoted by FGN.
We are given a directed fuzzy network );,( usAVG
u
F ⋅ with a set of nodes V, and a set of arcs A , an 
element  in V may be called as a player. Each node chooses a collection of communities that it wants to 
join by her participation level, and where aa us ⋅ , it denotes  the actual revenue from a unit of flow by 
corresponding participation level through arc a , ,, AFsAa ∈∈ 10 ≤≤ as . Let Vts ∈'' , be the single 
source and sink nodes of uFG , and assume that each arc in uFG  has a unit flow capacity. We call the fuzzy 
network u
FG simple if 1=jf  for every Aj∈  and each arc is owned by the all owners of one community 
by corresponding participation level. We do not impose any community on the sign of us ⋅ . In general, 
one may expect some of the components aa us ⋅  to be negative(reflecting the cost of the flow), while 
others are positive(to account for the associate revenue).  
Suppose that each arc in u
FG  is owned by all owners of community by corresponding participation level. 
Then, one naturally encounters the problem, resulting from an optimal flow in u
FG ,among the arc's owners. 
Such a problem can be formulated as a overlapping community formation game.Formally, Let 
);,( usAVGuF ⋅ be a simple fuzzy network. For AAA Fesecarscar ∈⊆ ,),()( (i.e. A]1,0[ ), denote by usG  the 
subnetwork of u
FG induced by the arcs in car(s), that is, denote by 
u
sG  the fuzzy network restricted to arcs 
whose owners belong to car(s). Define v(s) to be the optimal revenue (maximum with respect to the 
objective value vector (
aa us ⋅ ; )(scara∈ )resulting from an optimal s' to t' flow in usG . Clearly, the set 
function v and the vector Ae  define overlapping community formation game on )( Aecar , denoted by 
);()( veG AuF =Γ .
We propose that we shall interpret the natural overlapping communities, as a overlapping community 
formation game played by players. Every player has her intrinsic utility that associates with which 
communities she joins by participation level. The sheer goal every player aims to achieve is to maximize 
her own utility. The formation of overlapping communities is thus the joint result of each player by 
participation level.  
An imputation for the  overlapping community formation  game is a vector x=(x1,x2,…,xn) satisfying 
⑴
)( N
Ni
i evx =∑
∈
; ⑵ )( ii evx ≥ ， Ni∈∀
The  preimputation set I*(v) of  v∈FGN   is the set: ⎭
⎬⎫⎩⎨
⎧ =∈= ∑
∈
)()(* N
Ni
i
N evxRxvI
The  imputation set of  v∈FGN   is the set:
{ }NievxandevxRxvI iiN
Ni
i
N ∈∀≥=∈= ∑
∈
),()(|)(
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The Aubin core C(v)  of a community formation  fuzzy network game  v∈FGN is the set: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ∈∀≥⋅∈= ∑
∈Ni
N
ii FssvxsvIxvC )(|)()(
That is, each player i∈N  is supposed to gain a payoff proportional to her participation level when she 
partially cooperates. Where for each community s the total payoff is not smaller than v(s). so, if player i
gains xi for full cooperation, then his gain will be si·xi in case he participates at level si.This Aubin core 
can be interpreted into the overlapping community structure. 
3. Overlapping community structure 
The fuzzy bargaining sets of the fuzzy game can be interpreted  into the overlapping communities 
structure(Yaron Azrieli, Ehud Lehrer,2007; Aumann RJ,Maschler M.,1964).  
3.1. Fuzzy  reactive  bargaining  set 
Let  x  be an imputation of the overlapping community formation  game   v .Then, a  fuzzy objection  of  
player  k  against player   l  with respect to  x is a pair  (y,q) ,where NFq∈ with 0,0 => lk qq  and  y  is a 
vector whose indices are the members of  car(q)  such that 
iiii xqyq ⋅≥⋅ ,for all )(qcari∈ ; ).(
)(
qvyq i
qcari
i =⋅∑
∈
where for all Nscar ⊆)(  and jscarj j
N ussuRu ⋅−∈ ∑
∈ )(
)(, . We further say that  k  has a  justified objection  
against l  at  x ,if for every subset  car(s)  containing  l  and not  k , there is an objection  (y,q)  of  k
against l and  x  such that there does not exist a vector  z , indexed  in  car(s) ,satisfying 
iiii xszs ⋅≥⋅ ,for all )()( qcarscari ∩∈ ; iiii xszs ⋅≥⋅ , for all )(\)( qcarscari∈  and ).(
)(
svzs i
scari
i =⋅∑
∈
The  fuzzy  reactive bargaining  set   for the community is the set, )(vM rF  ,given by 
{
⎭⎬
⎫∈= lagainstobjectionjustifiedahavenotdoesklkpairorderedforvIxvM rF ,),()()(
In the definition of the reactive fuzzy bargaining set,the objecting player is allowed to retain the specifics 
of his/her objection until the objected player has announced his/her defending community. This way the 
objector is able to react to the move of his/her opponent,thus it becomes easier to raise justified objections. 
Intuitively, player  i  has a justified objection against player  j  with respect to  x ,if he can demonstrate 
that  j  can not sustain any community, containing player  j  and not  i , and still maintain her current 
payoff, jj xq ⋅ . Conversely, player  i  does not have a justified objection against player  j ,with respect to  
x ,if player j  can sustain at least one community, containing  j  but not  i ,and maintain her current payoff, 
NFq∈ , no matter how  i   forms his community and distributes the resulting proceeds. In the later case, a 
community which  j  uses to maintain her current payoff is called  protecting community  for player  j . 
3.2. Fuzzy semireactive bargaining set 
Let  (N,v)  be a overlapping community formation game, NRx∈ ,and Nlk ∈,  be distinct 
players.Define the collection )(NklΓ   by })()()({)( }\{ scarkecarscarN lNklkl ∈⊆=Γ=Γ
Hence,
klΓ   is the set of communities containing  k and not containing  l . A  fuzzy   objection  of  k
against  l at x  is a pair  (y,p) , )(,)( pcarkl Rypcar ∈Γ∈  ,satisfying 
andpvyp i
pcari
i ).(
)(
=⋅∑
∈
iiii xpyp ⋅≥⋅ ,for all )( pcari∈ ,
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If  (y,p)  has these properties, then we say that  k  is able to object against  l  via community  p . Note 
that  k  is able to object against  l  via 
klscar Γ∈)(  , if and only if the excess  e(s,x)=v(s)- 
i
scari
i xs ⋅∑
∈ )(
 is strictly 
positive. 
A fuzzy  counter objection  to an fuzzy objection  (y,p)  of  k against  l  at  x  is a pair  (z,q) ,
)(,)( qcarkl Rzqcar ∈Γ∈ ,satisfying  
)(
)(
qvzq i
qcari
i =⋅∑
∈
; )(qcarxz ≥   and  )()()()( qcarpcarqcarpcar yz ∩∩ ≥
If  (z,q)  has these properties, then we say that  l  is able to counter  (y,p)  via community  q  . Note that 
l  is able to counter  (y,p)  via klqcar Γ∈)( , if and only if .)()(),(
)()()()(
∑∑
∩∈∩∈
⋅Λ−⋅Λ=
qcarpcari
ii
qcarpcari
ii xqpyqpxqe
 The  fuzzy  semireactive  prebargaining set )(* vM srF of a overlapping community formation  game  (N,v)  
is the set of all preimputations )(* vIx∈  that satisfy the following condition for any pair of distinct 
players NNlk ×∈),(  for any  klqcar Γ∈)( :
There is klqcar Γ∈)( such that any objection of  k against  l  via community  p  can be countered by  l
via community q .
The fuzzy semireactive bargaining set  of  (N,v)  is defined to be the set )()()( * vIvMvM srF
sr
F I= of
individually rational elements of the fuzzy semireactive prebargaining set. 
3.3. Fuzzy Mas-Colell bargaining set 
Let x be an imputation of  the overlapping community formation  game v. Then, an weak fuzzy  
objection  of player   k against player  l  with respect to  x  is a pair  (y,s) , where 0,0, =>∈ lkN ssFs ,
and  y  is a vector whose indices are the members of  car(s)  such that 
iiii xsys ⋅≥⋅ ,for all )(scari∈ ,With  at least one strict ( ii xy > ); ).(
)(
svys i
scari
i =⋅∑
∈
       
Let x be an imputation of the overlapping community formation  game v and let (y,s) be an objection 
of player k against player l with respect to x.
Then, (z,t) is a strong  fuzzy  counter-objection  of player  l to the objection  (y,s)  of player  k  if 
0,0, =>∈ lkN ttFt , and  z  is a vector whose indices are the member of  car(t)  such that 
)(\)(, scartcarixtzt iiii ∈∀⋅≥⋅ ; )()(),()( scartcarixysxzt iiiiii I∈∀−⋅≥−⋅   and ).(
)(
tvzt i
tcari
i =⋅∑
∈
The  Mas-Colell  fuzzy  bargaining  set )(vMCF  of  the overlapping community formation  game  (N,v)  
is defined as the set of imputations at which every objection between any two players can be countered. 
Formally, 
{
⎭⎬
⎫∈=
countered.stronglybecanat x 
objectionfuzzyevery weak
)()( * vIxvMCF
Corollary 1.  In every simple overlapping community formation game, 
)()()()( vMCvMvMvC F
sr
F
r
FA ⊆⊆⊆
4. Overlapping community  structure discovery based on  fuzzy bargaining sets 
We propose that player’s choice depends on her current state when he needs to respond to the other 
players’ one. A player can only implement the following three operations. 
We provide one instance of experiment which demonstrates our observation is reasonably accurate. 
Our experiment searches for the node with one name in the co-authorship graph, which in fact represents 
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more than 20 individuals that have published in total more than 100 papers in computer science or 
relevant areas. We use only a subgraph of the co-authorship graph that contains 16 nodes because 
processing the whole graph would otherwise be too computationally intensive. The subgraph is obtained 
by using breadth first search from the given node until 16 nodes are discovered. Our algorithm discovers 
two communities containing the given name, Fig 1 summarizes the interrelation of co-authors in the two 
communities. 
Algorithm of overlapping community structure discovery based on fuzzy bargaining sets
Step 1: Join. Player vi joins a new community on top of the community he joins by the 
participation level si.;
Step 2: leave. Player vi leaves a community she is in by participation level 0.; 
Step 3: switch. Player vi switches from one community to another by changing participation 
level si.
Figure 1. The two communities structure discovered by the fuzzy Mas-Colell bargaining set 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present a method to discover the overlapping community structures in networks. The 
algorithm is mainly based on fuzzy bargaining sets. Our experiment show that, the resulting community 
structure naturally incorporate overlapping communities. 
In future, we will do further analysis in the overlapping problem and try to find the overlapping 
community structures from fuzzy game view. 
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